As a less restrictive trade regime is associated with greater responsiveness to economic incentives, econometric evidence that does not allow for the impact of import controls cannot be used reliably to assess the effect of a devaluation on the trade balance.
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Introduction
Understanding how import flows react to changing economic conditions is essential to the design of a successful structural adjustment
program.
There is widespread agreement that imports generally react more swiftly than exports to substantive trade liberalization, resulting in short-run current account imbalances and a need for temporary financing. This is, incidentally, one of the main justifications used by international organizations for supplementing structural adjustment packages with external loans. Being able to predict import flows more accurately can help policymakers assess more confidently the overall sustainability of an adjustment program, determine the appropriate speed of the trade liberalization process, and avoid the possibility of unexpected foreign exchange constraints jeopardizing the adjustment effort.
Unfortunately, several factors make predicting import flows in developing countries difficult. In particular, quantitative restrictions can be singled out because they drive a wedge between actual and desired imports, makin-the estimation of notional, i.e. unconstrained,l demand parameters problematic. Other complications include the pervasive presence of high and variable tariffs, which make observed border prices an unreliable indicator of import costs. Similarly, developing countries marked dependence on foreign capital goods makes aggregate estimation sometimes misleading (Khan 1975; de Helo and Vogt 1986 because the marginal propensity to import is highly dependent on the composition of income.
These issues have been addressed to some extent in the empirical literature on trade focusing on developing countries. Also, the modeling of the impact of quantitative restrictions has been given considerable attention. Khan (1974) , by positing that import restrictions vary over time in a serially correlated way, models their effect by assuming an autoregresFive process in the error term. Others CDutta 1964, Turnovsky 1968 and more recently, Chu et al. 1983 , Pritchett 1988 and Moran 1988 have used indicators of foreign exchange availability as a proxy for the government's inclination to impose import controls. An important shortcoming of this approach is that, with some noticeable exceptions (e.g. Chu et al. 1983 ), it does not allow for the recovery of the structural demand parameters.
This paper presents new and relatively comprehensive evidence about import behavior in developing countries, updatin; and generalizing the evidence presented in Khan (1974) . We focus on the impact of import controls and, because of data limitations, overlook the effect of tariffs and the aggregation problem (although in section 4 the issue is touched upon). Even in this more restricted framework, two tasks appear particularly worth pursuing: (1) the identification of *stable, parameters in the description of import behavior and (2) an analysis of the structural and policy determinants of the parameters themselves.
In pursuing these objectives, we have relied on three different but complementary approaches. First, traditional import demand functions relating import flows to relative price and domestic output were estimated for a set of 50 countries. The resulting parameters were then retained for a subsequent cross-country comparison of the pattern of income and price elasticities. This approach allows us to move closer to establishing a "standard' elasticity for countries with similar characteristics. The second approach relied on incorporating the foreign exchange constraint directly in the import demand equation. This approach was applied to -3 -countries for which a statistically satisfactory import demand equation
could not be identified using the first approach. Finally, the third line of attack relied on d'rect measures of import controls. The value of the structural impor't parameters was recovered from a behavioral equation relating the share of imports not subject to controls to price, output, and rationing measures (the latter to allow for any spillover effect). Given the large amount of data required to construct an adequate indicator of quar.itative restrictions, the equation was estimated for only one country.
The first four sections of this paper discuss the three approaches outlined above in more detail. A finding that recurs throughout these sections is that import restrictions in general significantly diminish the responsiveness of import demand to price and income incentives. The last section offers some conclusions.
The Traditional ALproach
A traditional import demand function relating real imports (M) to real income (Y) and the ratio of import prices (Pm) to domestic prices (PD) was estimated for 50 countriess
where V 1 (t) is an error term with the standard properties. This function was then tested to determine whether it was historically stable, generated serially uncorrelated residuals, and had predictive power. The resulting estimates of income and price elasticities are reported only for countries that passed the tests of misspecification. The most striking feature of the specification testing is that although only a few tests were undertaken, and despite the inclusion of a general dynamic form and the potential lack of power of the tests, import regressions for almost half In cases in which foreign exchange availability or, more generally, time-varying government controls cause unstable estimates, the model will need to be extended to account for these constraints. But, for countries for which a satisfactory import equation could be estimated, it can be argued that import controls were relatively constant over time; as a result, we were able to recover stable parameters describing import behavior. These are 'constrained, elasticities, however, measuring the responsiveness of imports that are, to some extent controlled. True (or notional) impor, elasticities, that is, elasticities that would prevail in the absence of c itrols, as we discuss later, are higher.
It is nonetheless of some interest to consider the pattern of estimated parameters (see Table 1 ). Income elasticities were usually precisely estimated and generally higher than one. The mean for the 28 country sample of income elasticities was 1.33. Only two countries had income elasticities significantly less than one, whereas 12 of the 28 countries (43 percent) had income elasticities significantly greater than one. We stress that these are 'secular' elasticities, i.e. they implicitly assume that changes in trend output have the same impact on imports as Sources Pritchett (1987) .
-6-cyclical fluctuations of production do. The income elasticity of imports will be significantly higher in the short run; as the evidence in the studies by Khan and Ross (1975) and indicates.
Thus the assumptton of a unit income elasticity, which is often made in the context of short and medium-run projections, proves to be inadequate.
The income elasticity estimates for developing countries reported here are quite close to estimates for developed countries. In their survey Goldstein and Khan (1985) report the results of a number of studies that estimate import activity elasticit!.es for 14 developed countries. The cross-country averages of the estimates from the four studies with broadest coverage ranged from 1.22 to 1.63. The central tendency of the previous estimates for developing countries is also above one. The modal value of Bahmani-Oskooee's 3 (1986) six-country estimates is 1.16.
Price elasticities were generally less precisely estimated. The average price elasticity of -.57, while a non-negligible price responsiveness, is less than one. Only 14 of the 28 countries had long-run price elasticities significantly different than zero (even at the 10 percent significance level). Only 2 countries had estimated price elasticities significantly greater than one, whereas 9 of the 28 countries have price elasticities significantly less than one. Hcst countries had price elasticities in the zero to one range, indicating that although price responsiveness is not entirely absent, it is not large, perhaps, as noticed A comparison of the literature on price elasticities reveals much less consensus on price than on income elasticities. In their 1985 review article, Goldstein and Rhan suumarize several studies of aggregate import price elasticities. 4 The reported cross-country average elasticity varies widely across studies. In Goldstein, et al., (1980) , the average price elasticity for the eight countries reported is .57.5 A paper by Geraci and Prewo (1980) Previous studies have shown that countries of similar size and income levels also display other economic similarities. Both the sectoral composition of production (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975) Although we cannot directly observe the impact of government policy on import responsiveness for any given country, we should be able, by looking at values across countries, to observe the impact of different policies on observed elasticities.
The Impact of Foreign Exchange Availabilita
The finding that in about 40 percent of developing countries the relationship between income and relative prices is unstable strongly suggests that there are other factors influencing import determination in such countries. Quantitative restrictions can be singled out as one of these factors. Whereas the pervasive presence of quantitative restrictions in developing countries is often motivated by the desire to foster domestic industrialization, the considerable variability of quantitative restrictions can be attributed mostly to balance of payment considerations.
The latter, following Hemphill (1974) and Winters (1985) , can in turn be related to the availability of foreign exchange. Thus, for example, a decrease in foreign exchange receipts may lead the government to tighten import controls and reduce import flows. 14 As a cursory review of the literature suggests, there are basically two ways to allow for this factor. Both approaches recognize that the government in most developing countries largely controls the allocation of foreign exchange and that the supply of imports is really the supply of foreign exchange made available to purchase imports. In the first approac-h (Hemphill 1974; Chu et al. 1983; and Moran 1988) , it is assumed that the policymaker fully controls the supply of foreign exchange and ateempts to optimize a cost function that includes among its arguments the deviation of imports and reserves from their long-run equilibrium levels and the discrepancy between actual and notional imports, tha.t is, the amount of rationing. Based on these assumptions, it is possible to relate the actual flow of imports to foreign exchange receipts, reserve levels, relative prices, and activity levels. Empirically, it is found that the inclusion of these foreign exchange indicators leads to much less precise estimates of both activity and price elasticities whose coefficienta are often not statistically different from zero. This finding can be taken either as an indication that the inclusion of "irrelevant" variables (i.e., the foreign exchange availability indicators) leads to a los of efficiency in the estimates and precludes precise estimation of price and activity parameters or that import responsiveness is much more limited for foreign exchange constrained countries.
This approach has both strengths and shortcomings. From a practical point of view, it allows us to assess, albeit indirectly, the impact of import controle based on a wide variety of indicators. However, with this approach, it is not possible to easily recover the true elasticities of demand and to assess the impact of changes in the trade regime. More important, the whole approach relies on the possibility of specifying a stable government objective function--which is not a practicable hypothesis when faced with the need to make judgements concerning a major structural adjustment programs. Finally, as Moran (1988) and Chu et al. (1983) point out, there are some econometric problems within this approach. Because foreign exchange receipts are in general not exogenous, the resulting estimates may be inconsistent.
The second approach (Pritchett 1988; Moran 1988) ln M(t)-aO + al ln F(t) + a 2 ln R(t-l) + a 3 tln Pit)-ln Pv(t)] + V 2 (t) (4) where M denotes imports, F and R denote real foreign exchange receipts and reserve levels respectively, and Pm and Pm denote the domestic and the border prines of imports, respectively. A higher value of the import premium (PM/Pm) may induce the government to supply more foreign exchange.
Otherwise a 3 -0.
In this model the domestic price of imports, Pm. will shift to equate supply and demand for foreign exchange. Prices will then be endogenous. To recover consistent estimates of the demand parameters, a two-stage least-squares procedure can be used with foreign exchange indicators P(t) and R(t-l) and other exogenous variables (PD,Y) as instruments. This approach is at first blush more promising. It allows for the recovery of all structural parameters, while taking into account the impact of foreign exchange availability. Empirically, both price and income elasticities turn out to be considerably higher than the corresponding price and income elasticities obtained by ordinary leestsquares estimation. There are, however, some important flaws. First, where foreign exchange is scarce and imports are to some extent rationed, economic agents will react to price, income, and controls. It is not reasonable under these circumstances to suppose that consumers will act according to their notional demand. More crucially, as noted earlier, in this set-up the domestic price of imports is endogenous and generally differs from the border price. If, as is generally the case, we observe only the border price variable, we will be faced with the problem of an error on the variable. Moreover, this error will be correlated with all the exogenous variables which are therefore no longer appropriate instruments.15
To address these issues, we considered the set of countries discussed in Section 1 for which it was not possible to identify a statistically satisfactory equation. 16 We then estimated an import demand equation using the second approach described above (i.e., taking indicators of foreign exchange availability as instruments) and tested throughout for the adequacy of the instrument set by means of a Sargan (1964) show no misspecification problems. The estimation results for these countries are summarized in Table 2 and presented in more detail in Table   A -2 in the appendix. Overall results are not at variance with what was found in section 1. Income elasticities are well determined and generally higher than one, and prices play a significant though less important role.
Although we have used a fairly broad set of instruments, there are still five countries for which the Sargan test shows significant value.
Therefore, a case can be made that at the root of the econometric troubles is the fact that instead of observing the domestic price of imports, we only observe their border values. Under such circumstances, it is easily shown that the reduced-form estimation of the demand for imports, while precluding the recovery of the structural parameters, is the only viable option. (See Table A -3 for full estimation results.)
Some care is now necessary in interpreting the coefficients. For instance, once again we find that income plays a major role in determining imports. However, we must allow for the fact that now income affects imports both directly (by raising import demand) and indirectly (by increasing export supply and foreign exchange availability). The reducedform coefficient in Table A -3 captures both these effects and will not -16 -provide an estimate of the notional income elasticity of demand.
Similarly, an increase in the price of domestic substitutes (PD) has two contrasting effects insofar as it leads directly to higher imports (the demand curve for imports shifts to the right) but also discourages exports, reduces foreign exchange receipts, and shifts the supply schedule for imports to the left. The net effect on import quantities is ambiguous and is reflected empirically in the shifting sign and low significance of the reduced-form coefficient associated with PD (Table A- In summary, considerable specification testing and common sense are required in order to find the most appropriate framework for determining import flow in a given country. Traditional import demand equations can provide the policymaker with valuable information on the price and activity responses of import flows. However, when considerations about the availability of foreign exchange become paramount, one of the approaches described above becomes more appropriate. However, limitations of these approaches and the resulting need for careful econometric practice
should not be overlooked. Also, if the need arises to recover the structural elasticities (for instance when predicting the impact of import liberalization), the experience of similar countries is useful--perhaps the cross-country analysis described in section 2.
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Modelirs Non-Tariff Barriers Directla
The demand for imports comes mostly from private consumers and producers. Under a stringent balv'ce of payments constraint, however, the government will restrict the availability of foreign exchange through price and especially nonprice mechanisms, moving demand for imported goods away from notional demand curves. Sometimes a direct measure of import controls is available, which can be incorporated in a model of rationed import demand. The key here is the recognition that in most developing countries not all imports are subject to controls, but even at the subcategory level, several foreign goods are freely importable into the country. By focusing the analysis on this subset of imports it is possible, with some additional assumptions, to recover estimates of structural parameters that can then be used to assess the impact of trade liberalization. More specifically, it is assumed that consumers and producers determine their optimal choice among three kinds of goods: free imports, restricted imports, and domestically produced commodities.
Border-relative import prices are constant. The crucial assumption is that the ratio of the marginal propensity to import rationed goods to the overall marginal propensity to import can be approximated by the import coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers (i.e., by the ratio of restricted imports to total imports). Table 3 ). Also, by using these notional parameters, it was possible to estimate the impact of a full repeal of import controls. Not surprisingly, the biggest impact was on consumer goods, for which steady state value of impoLts would have consumption goods, will lead to an upsurge of imports. Whether this can be Bertola and Faini (1987) IJ Notional Price Elasticity: 1-P -20 -generalized to other countries remains to be seen. Common sense and the experience of some countries (like Turkey) would suggest that consumption good imports may indeed react swiftly to trade liberalization.
Conclusions
The modeling and estimation of imoort demand in a context in which trade controls are pervasive is arduous. Yet for the purpose of policy simulation and a firm understanding of how imports react to changing economic conditions, solid empirical work is indispensable to this effect.
We have pursued three approaches, all of which have strengths and shortcomings. Traditional import equations work well when import controls are relatively stable over time (first option). But it is fairly difficult to determine a priori whether this is indeed the case. In the absence of a priori information and short of using the full set of misspecification tests, one could perhaps rely on a comparison between the estimated elasticity and the 'norm' computed in this study.
If the difference between the two values is deemed to be too high, an approach that allows for the impact of foreign exchange availability should be used (second option). Of course, if there are strong a priori reasons to believe that the country has foreign exchange constraints, the traditional specification should be immediately bypassed. Still, it must not be forgotten that the incorporation of the foreign exchange constraint in the import demand equation is beset by several difficulties. In fact, Although these caveats should be borne in mind when analyzing our results, our study has been able to convey some useful facts on both the modeling and the behavior of import flows in developing countries. In sum, we have shown that "measured" income elasticities in developing countries are generally higher than one and relative prices, although they are mostly inelastic, significantly affect demand for imports. When the lack of foreign exchange or, more generally, a restrictive trade regime effectively constrains import flows, the measured impact of price and activity variables becomes less pronounced. To recover structural elasticities in such a case, one can develop a direct modeling of quantitative restrictions which is arduous, or one can use the experience of a structurally similar country which is quicker. In general, a less restrictive trade regime is associated with higher responsiveness of imports to economic incentives.
We conclude that the econometric evidence that does not allow for the impact of import controls cannot be used reliably to assess the effect of a devaluation on the trade balance. Indeed, if devaluation is combined with a liberalization of the trade regime (a common feature of many adjustment programs), its effect on import demand will be more pronounced than the available evidence would suggest. 
and export demand is equal to
with possibly d 2 --- where b 2 <O. It is also assumed that F-PxX (i.e. only export revenues matter).
As mentioned in the text, it is not possible, unless someone is willing to estimate the full reduced form for all the endogenous variables (as performed in Chu et al. 1983) , to recover the structural parameters of the import demand equation. Therefore, care must be used in interpreting the coefficients in Table A3 Ghana and the Dominican Republic, but as noticed by Kiviet (1986) , in the small sample its actual size may exceed its nominal size by a very large factor. (Neary and Roberts, 1980 ) that the price responsiveness of consumer demand will vary if some commodities happen to be rationed. Accordingly, it is useful to distinguish between notional price responsiveness, i.e., the consumer response to price change when no commodity if subject to ration and constrained price responsiveness.
2/ Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Mexico all failed both tests (sub-sample and post-sample) of stability. Among oil exporters only Indonesia and Gabon were included.
3/ This study capriciously excludes a negative estimate for Israel. 7/ The lower price elasticity estimates could be explained by the sectoral composition of developing country imports. Fuels (SITC 3) and food (SITC 0 and 1), which are a larger component of developing country than of developed country imports, have on average much lower price elasticities than manufactures (SITC 5-9).
8/ Khan does test for auto-correlation and finds significant first-order auto-correlation in 6 of 15 (40 percent) regressions. This finding is similar to this paper's rejection of 43 percent (22 of 50), the import functions estimated.
9/ Including Turkey's estimate of 2.29 raises the average to 1.07.
10/ The double-log functional form used to estimate the elasticities imposes constant elasticity. Therefore, assuming after estimation that the elasticities vary across countries because of factors related to income violates the original maintained hypothesis. However, the cross-country variation in real per capita income far Continued on next page Continued from previous page exceeds the within country variation. A step-function relation could be postulated that would allow constant elasticities within countries but a pattern across countries. A functional form that did not impose constant elasticities was also estimated but precisely the same pattern was detected using these estimates.
11/ The double-log functional form used to estimate the elasticities imposes constant elasticity. Therefore, assuming after estimation that the elasticities vary across countries in a way related to income violates the original maintained hypothesis. However, the cross-country variation in real per capita income far exceeds the within-country variation. A step function relation could be postulated that would allow constant elasticities within countries but a pattern across countries. Secondly, a functional form that did not impose constant elasticities was estimated and precisely the same pattern was detected using these estimates.
12/ These GLS results weighing each price elasticity observation by its estimated standard error to account for the differences in precision of estimation across countries. The OLS are, reassuringly similar. , et al. (1985) provide some evidence on the relationship between sectoral composition of imports and per capita income, but they estimate only a linear term.
13/ McCarthy
14/ There are, of course, other justification to the inclusion of foreign exchange availability indicators in an import demand equation. It could be argued, for instance, that reserve levels and foreign exchange receipts act as a proxy for present and future wealth, which in turn is likely to affect import demand. Alternatively, the fact that we observe the border and not the domestic price of imports may, under some conditions, lead to the inclusion of foreign exchange indicators in the import demand equation.
15/ This can be easily seen if we consider that when we only observe PWm and not Pm. the error term in the equation will include an expression in Pm -pw which is obviously correlated with all the exogenous variables. This effect, first noticed in , is also mentioned in Moran (1980) .
161
Lack of sufficiently long series for the full set of foreign exchange indicators forced us to consider only a subset of 12 out of the initial 20 countries.
17/ The latter, under the null hypothesis of no correlation between errors and instruments, is distributed as X 2 (n) with n equal to the difference between the number of instruments and of right-hand side variables.
18/ We use the term lexogenous' a bit loosely here. By exogenous we only mean to imply that the right-hand-side variables are not correlated with the error term. Notice that we assume throughout that this is indeed the case for R(t-1).
19/ There is no way to rigorously justify this assumption. We can only argue that if import regimes are made more stringent by shifting commodities into the restricted list, there will be a strong and positive correlation between the import coverage ratio of NTB and the non-tariff barriers ratio of the marginal propensity to import rationed goods to the overall marginal propensity to import. Indeed both indicators will increase when commodities are shifted into the restricted list.
20/ It would also be essential to inquire from national sources how import prices are computed. In general, import prices are based on border prices and therefore are an inadequate measure of true import costs to domestic agents.
21/ An increase in the coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers may indeed indicate that controls are more stringent (more goods are subject to quantitative restrictions) or that they have become more lenient (more restricted goods are allowed into the country). Although for Morocco the quantitative restriction indicator was clear, it is certainly not so in every developing country.
